I don't feel noways tired

 

Gooners and Goners

"Is there a timeline, a regulatory environment, in which the internet does not turn into a highly efficient manufacturer of niche suicide cults?"

"Looking back now, there are things I could’ve done to make my time in that stream room more successful. I could’ve purchased one of the many complicated male masturbation toys the gooners had drawn my attention to. I could’ve spent my years of peak brain development romping around a toxic-waste site, slurping sludge and indiscriminately licking circuit boards. As things stand, I can say only that it wasn’t for me. If there is a goonstate, I failed even to reach its threshold, stalling instead at states better known to me—the state of despair, the state of panic, the state of paralyzed awe at the onrushing future. I sat alone in a room with a laptop, watching myself watch other guys watch porn, wondering what the world will look like when I am old."

https://harpers.org/archive/2025/11/the-goon-squad-daniel-kolitz-porn-masturbation-loneliness/

The Japanese debt bubble in retrospect

 via Claude:

What Caused the Bubble Run-Up?

The Plaza Accord (1985) The Plaza Accord directly led to yen appreciation and incentivized lowering the discount rate in 1986 and 1987, considered one of the direct causes of the asset price bubble. Japan's central bank flooded the economy with cheap money to offset the damage from a strengthening yen, which hurt exporters.

Extremely Loose Monetary Policy Interest rates declined to historically low levels in the second half of the 1980s, reflecting substantial easing of monetary policy. Banks were directed to lend aggressively through "window guidance" quotas from the Bank of Japan. Banks aggressively promoted loans to smaller firms backed by properties, and around 1987-1988 even ordinary salarymen could easily borrow up to 100 million yen using their house as collateral.

Tax Incentives and Financial Engineering Japan had a system where capital gains on land weren't taxed until sale, and interest payments were tax-deductible. This created huge incentives to speculate on real estate. Companies engaged in "zaitech"—financial engineering where 40 to 50 percent of corporate earnings were tied to zaitech-related gains from speculating with borrowed money.

Moral Hazard The cozy relationship of corporations to banks and the implicit guarantee of a taxpayer bailout created significant moral hazard, leading to crony capitalism and reduced lending standards. Risk was socialized—everyone believed the government wouldn't let major institutions fail.

What Caused the Crash?

Sharp Monetary Tightening Trying to deflate speculation and keep inflation in check, the Bank of Japan sharply raised inter-bank lending rates in late 1989. This abruptly cut off the cheap credit fueling the bubble, and asset prices collapsed.

What Caused the Deflation?

Balance Sheet Recession Economist Richard Koo's explanation has become influential: A financial crisis generating huge losses in wealth causes both firms and households to prioritize repairing their balance sheets—firms minimize debt rather than maximize profit, and households increase savings at the expense of consumption.

Despite zero interest rates and money supply expansion, Japanese corporations in aggregate opted to pay down debts from business earnings rather than borrow to invest. When everyone is paying down debt simultaneously, aggregate demand collapses.

Zombie Companies and Banks Financial institutions were bailed out through capital infusions, cheap credit, and the ability to postpone recognition of losses, turning them into zombie banks. These zombie banks kept lending to unprofitable "zombie companies," preventing resources from flowing to productive uses and depressing overall economic dynamism.

The Deflation Trap Under deflation, the value of cash increases as time passes, so Japanese companies began cutting wages, research and development, and other investments, opting to hold cash instead. This created a vicious cycle: falling prices → delayed purchases → weaker demand → more price cuts.

Policy Mistakes The Bank of Japan was criticized for being too slow to respond. Rate cuts in the early 1990s were gradual, and it took ten years for the Bank to commit even halfheartedly to a zero interest rate policy. They also prematurely tightened policy in 2000 just as deflation was becoming entrenched.

The combination—a massive debt overhang, broken banks, corporate caution, and inadequate monetary response—locked Japan into decades of deflation and stagnation. Unlike most crashes where you get inflation from currency weakness, Japan's crash coincided with everyone trying to save and deleverage simultaneously, creating the opposite problem.